Robert E. Verrecchia - Accounting Department.

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Verrecchia, Robert E., Essays on disclosure, Journal of Accounting and Economics 32, 97-180. Topics. Academic blog; Related content. Blogs Secret offshore vehicles and investor concerns. 2020-04-17T12:08:00Z. By James O’Donovan, Finance Professor at City University of Hong Kong, Hannes Wagner, Finance Professor at Bocconi University, and Stefan Zeume, Finance Professor at University of.

Belinda Crawford Camiciottoli (2013). Rhetoric in Financial Discourse. A Linguistic Analysis of ICT-mediated Disclosure Genres.

View Artikel 1 from ACCOUNTING 13 at Gajah Putih University. REVIU ARTIKEL Essays on Disclosure Oleh: Robert E. Verrecchia The Wharton School 2400 Steinberg Hall - Dietrich Hall University of.

Samuels, Delphine, Daniel Taylor, and Robert Verrecchia, Financial Misreporting: Hiding in the Shadows or in Plain Sight, working paper 2019. Heinle, Mirko, Kevin Smith, and Robert E. Verrecchia, Risk-Factor Disclosure and Asset Prices, The Accounting Review, 2018.

Abstract. The use of stock options as executive compensation, after having developed in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s, has spread to continental Europe in the past fift.

This paper adopts and reviews discretionary disclosure and cheap talk models to analyze risk reporting incentives and their relation to regulation. Given its inherent discretion, risk reporting depends on disclosure incentives. To assess these incentives the analytical models consider risk reporting as an endogenous feature, thereby providing a benchmark to discuss regulatory attempts.

ROBERT BUSHMAN. University of Chicago. Search for more papers by this author. SUNIL DUTTA. University of California, Berkeley. Search for more papers by this author. JOHN HUGHES. Duke University. Search for more papers by this author. RAFFI INDJEJIKIAN. University of Michigan.

We investigate the role of corporate investor relations (IR) in the correction process of mispricing. We provide robust evidence of accruals' mispricing for the sub-sample of firms with lower-rated IR. However, mispricing is more pronounced among firms with higher valuation uncertainty. Further analyses show that firms with higher-rated IR on average earn higher returns, and this relation is.

While the intuition underlying each of the variables seems plausible, Verrecchia (2001) argues that disclosure models can be characterized as an eclectic mingling of highly idiosyncratic economic-based models, and challenges researchers to take the first steps to unification. First, we investigate the role of ownership and competition variables in explaining voluntary segment disclosures in.

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We model an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. Like the classic cheap talk setup, the informed player sends a message to an uninformed receiver who is to take an action which affects the payoffs of both players. However, unlike the classic cheap talk setup, the sender can communicate only through the use of discrete messages.